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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent model of adverse selection where, in order to trade with the principal,
the agent must undertake a relationship-speciﬁc investment which aﬀects his outside option to trade,
i.e. the payoﬀ that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal. This creates a distinction
between the agent’s ex ante (before investment) and ex post (after investment) outside options to trade.
We investigate the consequences of this distinction, and show that whenever an agent’s ex ante and ex
post outside options diﬀer, this may equip the principal with an additional tool for screening among
diﬀerent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs once the agent
has undertaken the investment. In turn, this may enhance the eﬃciency of the optimal second-best
contract.
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11 Introduction
In many forms of bilateral exchange, one party has to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investments before
trade can occur with their partner. An important consequence of such speciﬁc investments is that they
typically change the investing party’s outside option to trade, namely the payoﬀ that he would obtain by
trading with an alternative partner. For example, a ﬁrm that tailors its machinery in order to produce
a speciﬁc widget required by a certain buyer, will change its production possibilities when trading with
alternative buyers whose requirements need not be the same.1
A key distinction therefore exists between the ﬁrm’s ex ante outside option, before the relationship-
speciﬁc investment is undertaken, and their ex post outside option, after the investment has occurred.
This paper investigates the consequences of this distinction in principal-agent models of adverse selection,
where the agent’s type is his private information, and both parties are risk neutral. We show that whenever
an agent’s ex ante and ex post outside options diﬀer, this may equip the principal with an additional tool
for screening among diﬀerent agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs
once the agent has undertaken the speciﬁc investment. In turn, this may enhance the eﬃciency of the
optimal second-best contracts.
This paper contributes to the literature on mechanism design when agents have type-dependent outside
options (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1995, Jullien 2000). The literature on
adverse selection identiﬁes several cases in which the optimal mechanism can involve randomization, such
as when agents have diﬀerent levels of risk aversion (Stiglitz 1982, Arnott and Stiglitz 1988, Brito et
al 1995), when the agent’s type-space is multi-dimensional (Baron and Myerson 1982, Rochet 1984 and
Thanassoulis 2004), or when randomization might allow non-monotonic allocation schedules to become
incentive compatible (Strausz 2006). A further rationale for randomization is presented by Calzolari and
Pavan (2006), who show that, in principal-agent problems with sequential contracting, randomization
may be optimal, since it allows one principal to hide information from another principal. We add to
the literature by considering situations where relationship-speciﬁc investments aﬀect the agent’s future
prospects, so that his type-dependent ex ante and ex post outside options diﬀer. This provides a novel
rationale of why randomization may be optimal in principal-agent settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the principal-agent model.
Section 3 solves for the optimal second best contracts. Section 4 discusses the eﬃciency consequences of
having both types of outside option and also addresses possible extensions. All proofs and a numerical
example are in the Appendix.
2 Model
Preliminaries We consider a principal-agent model with a principal P and an agent A, who contract
over the production of output, q. Production is assumed to be observable and veriﬁable. The agent’s
marginal cost of production, θ, which deﬁnes his type, is not observed by the principal, and we assume
1This phenomenon is not conﬁned to bilateral exchange between ﬁrms. Consider a traveller who wants to travel from A
to B at 8pm on a given day. The traveller can choose whether to travel by train or bus. The speciﬁc investment undertaken
by the traveller in order to access a certain type of travel takes the form of him being physically present at a particular
location — the bus or train station — at a particular time. While from an ex ante perspective the traveller’s outside option
to catching the 8pm bus would be to take the 8pm train, once he has made the speciﬁc investment of arriving at the bus
station prior to 8pm, his ex post outside option to catching the 8pm bus will be quite diﬀerent. While he may for example
catch the 9pm train, the 8pm train has been ruled infeasible by his earlier speciﬁc investment.
2θ ∈ {θH,θL}, where θH > θL > 0, and prob(θ = θH) = λ. In order to trade with the principal, the agent
must undertake a relationship-speciﬁc investment, with cost normalized to zero. The agent’s decision to
undertake the investment is observable and veriﬁable. A contract between the principal and the agent
is denoted {φ,π,q,T}, where φ ∈ {0,1} speciﬁes whether the agent must undertake the investment2,
π ∈ [0,1] denotes the probability with which trade occurs between the parties, q ∈ [0,q] denotes the
output that the agent must produce in case of trade, and T ∈ R+ indicates the payment from the
principal to the agent (independent of whether trade actually occurs or not). We assume trade can only
occur if the agent has made the relationship-speciﬁc investment so that if φ = 0, π = 0.3
The principal’s problem consists of designing the optimal menu of contracts from which the agent
makes his preferred choice. The revelation principle states this search can be conﬁned to the set of direct
revelation mechanisms, whereby the agent is requested to report his type and is oﬀered a contract that
is contingent upon this report. The timing of actions is then as follows.
t=0 P oﬀers A a menu of contracts M = {MH,ML}, where Mi = {φi,πi,qi,Ti} is the contract oﬀered
to the agent when his reported type is θi, i = H,L.
t=0.5 If A accepts Mi and Mi speciﬁes φi = 1, A undertakes the relationship-speciﬁc investment.
t=1 Conditional on φi = 1, trade occurs with probability πi, in which case A produces qi. With
probability 1 − πi trade between A and P does not occur. If φi = 0, trade between A and P does not
occur with certainty.
t=1.5 Provided that he has respected the terms of the contract, A receives Ti.
Without loss of generality we restrict attention to contracts that always induce truthtelling and
participation by the agent.
Agent’s Ex ante and Ex post Outside Options If the agent does not accept the principal’s
contract, or if his contract prescribes φi = 0, then the agent does not undertake any relationship-speciﬁc
investment, and obtains a payoﬀ Bi ≥ 0 from alternative trade, where i = H,L. This deﬁnes the agent’s
ex ante outside option. Importantly, we allow for the possibility that ex ante outside options diﬀer
across types, so that BH  = BL. If the agent undertakes the relationship-speciﬁc investment, but trade
between the parties does not occur, then the agent obtains a payoﬀ Ci < Bi from alternative trade. Ci
captures the agent’s ex post outside option, namely the value of his trading prospects with alternative
principals, after having undertaken the relationship-speciﬁc investment with the previous principal. Ex
post outside options may also be type-dependent, so that CH  = CL. The expression Bi − Ci > 0 reﬂects
the loss in terms of the agent’s alternative trading prospects from undertaking the relationship-speciﬁc
investment, which tailors his production to the principal’s needs. We refer to this as the opportunity cost
of randomization, since this cost is only incurred when πi < 1.
Payoﬀs Both parties are assumed to be risk neutral with respect to monetary transfers and pro-
duction. If a type θi agent accepts a contract {φi,πi,qi,Ti}, his net expected utility is,
u(θi) = Ti + φi {−θiπiqi + (1 − πi)Ci − Bi}. (1)
2Allowing the contract to specify φ enables us to restrict attention to contracts that are always accepted by the agent.
We thank an anonymous referee for providing this suggestion.
3By restricting attention to φ ∈ {0,1} we rule out the possibility of the principal randomizing over φ. This is done to
shorten the exposition of our results. The possibility of randomization over φ is discussed in section 4.
3The principal’s expected payoﬀ is UP = φiπivqi − Ti, where v > θH. Let ui denote the utility obtained
by a type θi agent when he truthfully declares his type. From (1), holding constant all other dimensions
of the contract oﬀered to type θi, there is a one-to-one relation between Ti and ui. In what follows we
will therefore characterize a contract as Mi = {φi,πi,qi,ui}. Finally, we denote θH −θL as ∆θ, CH −CL
as ∆C, BH − BL as ∆B and uH − uL as ∆u.
3 Results
The participation constraint for a type θi agent is ui = Ti + φi [−θiπiqi + (1 − πi)Ci − Bi] ≥ 0. The
incentive compatibility constraints which ensure agents ﬁnd it optimal to declare their true type are,
ICH : uH ≥ uL + φL [−πLqL∆θ + (1 − πL)∆C − ∆B].
ICL : uL ≥ uH + φH [πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B].
Suppose full information contracts are oﬀered so that φi = πi = 1, qi = q, and ui = 0 for i = H,L.
Constraint ICH becomes, 0 ≥ −q∆θ − ∆B, and ICL becomes, 0 ≥ q∆θ + ∆B. We focus on the more
intuitive case in which q∆θ+∆B > 0 so that θL types have incentives to overstate their costs and mimic
θH types. This is embodied in assumption A1 below.4 To ensure that under full information the optimal
contract prescribes φi = πi = 1, qi = q for both types, assumption A2 below is required.
A1: q∆θ + ∆B > 0
A2: q(v − θi) ≥ Bi, i = H,L
Our ﬁrst result provides a partial characterization of type θH’s optimal contract whenever θH agents
are required to undertake the relationship-speciﬁc investment.
Lemma 1: It is never optimal for the principal to oﬀer φH = 1 in conjunction with πH and qH satisfying,
πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B < 0. (2)
Under A1 the full information contracts would violate ICL. By oﬀering type θH agents a contract such
that πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B = 0, the principal ensures both that ICL is satisﬁed and that no
rents are oﬀered to θL agents. Oﬀering θH agents a contract such that (2) holds would only increase the
distortions of πH and/or qH from their full information values (1 and q respectively) without generating
any gain for the principal. This is essentially the rationale for Lemma 1.
An implication of Lemma 1 is that the participation constraint of type θL will not bind at the optimum.
This is because, given type θH’s participation, ICL implies uL ≥ uH ≥ 0. In what follows, we therefore
allow ICL to hold with equality, let uH = 0, and ignore constraint ICH. We then later verify that the
solution of the relaxed problem indeed satisﬁes ICH. The principal’s problem then is,
max
qi∈[0,q], πi∈[0,1],
φi∈{0,1}, i=H,L
UP =
λφH [πHqH(v − θH) + (1 − πH)CH − BH] +
(1 − λ)φL [πLqL(v − θL) + (1 − πL)CL − BL] −
(1 − λ)φH [πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B]
(P)
4For completeness, in the Appendix, we state the main results for the case in which the parameter values are such that
high types have incentives to understate their type and mimic low cost types. These two cases arise because of the existence
of the type-dependent ex ante outside options, Bi, as has been analyzed in detail by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995).
Note that in the knife-edge case where q∆θ + ∆B = 0 the principal can oﬀer the full information contract to both types
without inducing either to mimic the other, so this is clearly her favored course of action.
4subject to φH [πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B] ≥ 0. (C1)
where (C1) derives from Lemma 1. We ﬁrst solve (P) ignoring (C1). If the solution satisﬁes (C1) with
strict inequality, it is the solution to the overall problem. Otherwise (C1) binds.
The principal faces a standard trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and informational rents. If she oﬀers θH
types the eﬃcient (full-information) contract where φH = πH = 1, qH = q, then she must also oﬀer
positive rents to θL types to prevent mimicking. In this case (C1) is slack. If the principal wishes to
eliminate θL’s rents, then she must distort type θH’s contract away from the eﬃcient contract.5 In this
case (C1) binds so, conditional on φH = 1, we have,
qH =
(1 − πH)∆C − ∆B
πH∆θ
. (3)
When ∆C −∆B > 0 — i.e., the opportunity cost of randomization is higher for θL than for θH — then (3)
implies that ∂qH/∂πH < 0. By lowering πH the principal can increase qH whilst keeping θL’s rents at
zero. A trade-oﬀ then emerges. A lower πH decreases the probability of trade, but it also increases qH,
and hence the value of trade. When the latter eﬀect is stronger than the former, the optimal contract
(conditional on C1 binding) prescribes qH = q and πH = (∆C − ∆B)/(q∆θ + ∆C) ∈ (0,1), i.e. it
prescribes randomization.6 Proposition 1 fully describes the optimal second best contracts.7
Proposition 1: For type θL, the optimal contract always prescribes φL = πL = 1, qL = q. If
λ > max
￿
∆C + q∆θ
q(v − θL) − CL
,
∆θ
v − θL
,
∆B + q∆θ
q(v − θL) − BL
￿
, (4)
then (C1) is slack, and the optimal contract for type θH has φH = πH = 1, qH = q. If (4) does not
hold, then (C1) binds, and the optimal contract for type θH is
(i) if CH >
CL(v−θH)
v−θL and ∆C − ∆B >
(BH−CH)(q∆θ+∆C)
q(v−θH)−CH > 0: φH = 1, πH = ∆C−∆B
q∆θ+∆C and qH = q.
(ii) if CH <
CL(v−θH)
v−θL and ∆B < −BH∆θ
v−θH < 0: φH = πH = 1 and qH = −∆B
∆θ .
(iii) in all the other cases: φH = 0.
If prob(θ = θH) = λ is suﬃciently high, then the principal ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer θH types the
eﬃcient contract, so as to maximize her proﬁt when trading with θH types, even if this implies that
positive rents are relinquished to agents of type θL. Conversely, if λ is suﬃciently low, then the principal
prefers to allow (C1) to bind and so eliminate any rents to θL types.
Proposition 1 shows that in order for the optimal contract for θH to prescribe randomization, ∆C−∆B
should be positive, and suﬃciently large. Intuitively, ∆C − ∆B > 0 implies that the opportunity cost
of randomization is higher for θL types than for θH. Hence, by oﬀering θH types a contract involving
randomization, the principal can lower the incentives of θL types to overstate their costs and mimic θH
types. By contrast, if ∆C − ∆B < 0, then θH types stand to lose more from randomization than θL
types, and so randomization would not help deter θL from mimicking θH. Similarly, if ∆C = ∆B = 0 —
as is the case if both ex ante and ex post outside options are type-invariant so BH = BL and CH = CL —
then the opportunity cost of randomization is the same for both types, and again randomization is not an
5Given the linearity of her payoﬀ, the principal would never select contracts between these extremes.
6That (∆C − ∆B)/(q∆θ + ∆C) ∈ (0,1) follows from ∆C − ∆B > 0 and assumption A1.
7We adopt the convention that if P is indiﬀerent between setting φi = 1 or φi = 0 for i = H,L, then she selects φi = 0.
Similarly, if she is indiﬀerent between all πi ∈ [0,1] (resp., all qi ∈ [0,q]) then P selects πi = 0 (resp., qi = 0).
5eﬀective screening tool. This clariﬁes why type-dependent outside options are essential for randomization
to be optimal.
Note that, in order for randomization to be optimal, ∆C −∆B should not only be positive, but also
suﬃciently large. This ensures that a small amount of randomization in the contract oﬀered to θH is
suﬃcient to deter θL from mimicking, and guarantees that the principal can obtain a positive expected
proﬁt when trading with type θH.
What are the implications of ∆C−∆B > 0? From (3), we know that when (C1) binds and ∆C−∆B >
0 then a trade-oﬀ emerges between πH and qH. A lower πH decreases the probability of trade, but it also
increases qH, and hence the value of trade. For randomization to be optimal, the principal must then be
willing to lower the probability of trade with θH in order to raise qH at the margin. Whether this occurs
or not, depends on the precise comparison between the costs (i.e., trade with θH occurs less often) and
the beneﬁts (i.e., qH is higher) of randomization.
To see how the former may outweigh the latter, consider the simple case where CL < CH < 0,
BH = BL = 0. Since ex ante outside options are independent of type, if πH = 1, this case corresponds to
the canonical model. As can be seen from (C1), leaving no rents to type θL then requires qH = 0. The
principal’s payoﬀ when dealing with type θH is then equal to zero. By contrast, setting πH < 1 allows
the principal to set qH = (1 − πH)∆C/πH∆θ > 0. Here, the cost of imposing randomization is null,
since when πH = 1 trading with type θH generates no proﬁts (this follows from qH = 0). By contrast,
if CH is not too negative, i.e. CH > CL(v − θH)/(v − θL), then the beneﬁt of randomization is strictly
positive, since it allows the principal to obtain a strictly positive expected payoﬀ when dealing with θH.8
Conditional on the principal wishing to leave no rents to type θL (which, as highlighted by proposition
1, happens whenever λ is suﬃciently low), randomization is then clearly optimal. Given the linearity of
her payoﬀ, if the principal ﬁnds it optimal to sacriﬁce πH in order to raise qH at the margin, then she
goes all the way, and sets qH as high as possible in the optimal contract, i.e. qH = q. From (3), πH is
then equal to (∆C − ∆B)/(q∆θ + ∆C).
A Numerical Example In the Appendix, we discuss a numerical example where θH = 0.75,
θL = 0.25, q = v = 2, and the agent’s ex ante and ex post outside options are BH = 1.85, BL = 2.35,
CH = 1.75, and CL = 1.95. In that case, it is straightforward to show that, for λ < 0.52, the optimal
contract oﬀered to type θH prescribes φH = 1,πH = 0.375 and qH = q = 2.
4 Discussion
Eﬃciency Proposition 1 highlights the impact of having two (i.e., ex ante and ex post) type-
dependent outside options on the optimal second best contracts. Suppose that, on the contrary, Ci = Bi
for both i = H,L, so ∆C = ∆B. From (3), the only way for (C1) to then bind is to set qH = −∆B/∆θ.
If (4) does not hold and ∆B ≥ −BH∆θ/(v − θH), then the optimal contract prescribes φH = 0, i.e. no
trade between the principal and agents of type θH, since with qH = −∆B/∆θ the principal would never
8The principal’s expected payoﬀ from dealing with θH when qH = (1 − πH)∆C/πH∆θ is equal to
(1 − πH)[CH(v − θL) − CL(v − θH)]/∆θ−BH. In this simple example, BH = 0. The condition CH > CL(v−θH)/(v − θL)
is therefore both necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that randomization is optimal whenever (C1) binds. More generally, this
requirement is only necessary (as highlighte in part (i) of proposition 1, another condition is also required). Intuitively, if
CH is very low, then the transfer necessary to induce type θH to accept a contract involving randomization would be large,
and randomization would therefore not be optimal.
6obtain a non-negative proﬁt when dealing with type θH. In contrast when Bi  = Ci, trade between the
principal and agents of type θH may occur with positive probability even if ∆B ≥ −BH∆θ/(v − θH).9
Hence, in a complete contracting environment, the need for agents to undertake relationship-speciﬁc
investments ex ante that decrease the agent’s outside option, can result in greater ex post eﬃciency, that is,
at the production stage. This is because such investments enable the principal to utilize randomization as
a tool to screen between agent types. To our knowledge, the earlier literature has not noted this potentially
useful role for ex ante relationship-speciﬁc investments to improve on ex post eﬃciency. The literature
has emphasized rather, that in the presence of contractual incompleteness, investment speciﬁcity results
in ex ante ineﬃciencies, i.e. ineﬃciencies at the investment stage (Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986,
Hart and Moore 1990).
Relaxing the Linearity Assumption The restriction to linear payoﬀ functions allows us to ab-
stract from risk-aversion considerations, and to diﬀerentiate our results from the existing literature on
randomization in mechanism design (Stiglitz 1982, Arnott and Stiglitz 1988, Brito et al 1995). However,
our results extend also to non-linear settings. To see this, suppose agents face convex production costs,
so the net utility of an type θi agent when accepting a contract {φ,π,q,T} is,
T + φ[−πθig(q) + (1 − π)Ci − Bi]. (5)
where g′(q) > 0 and g′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0. Suppose that, if oﬀered the full-information contract, a type
θL agent would overstate his cost and mimic type θH, as was the case throughout Section 3. Condition
(C1) then is,
φH [πHg(qH)∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B] ≥ 0. (C1′)
Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, for λ suﬃciently low, the optimal contract for type θH
agents is such that C1′ binds. Then, conditional on φH = 1, we have,
qH = g−1
￿
(1 − πH)∆C − ∆B
πH∆θ
￿
. (6)
As in the linear case, when ∆C − ∆B > 0, (6) implies that ∂qH/∂πH < 0, so that, by lowering πH,
the principal can increase qH. Clearly, this is a necessary requirement for randomization to be oﬀered,
or else the principal would always optimally select πH = 1. Note that, in contrast with the linear case
above, in this non-linear case the trade-oﬀ between πH and qH may actually make UP concave in πH —
thus warranting randomization even in the absence of restrictions on feasible output quantities. To see
this, let g(q) = 0.5q2, and suppose that parameter values continue to follow the numerical example given
above, but the restriction that q may not exceed q is relaxed.
Expression (6) then becomes qH =
￿
0.8 + 1.2
πH. Conditional on φH = 1, the principal’s expected
payoﬀ when dealing with a type θH agent is UP = πH
￿
2
￿
0.8 + 1.2
πH − 0.75
￿
0.4 + 0.6
πH
￿
− 1.75
￿
− 0.1,
which is concave in πH. The optimal contract for θH is φH = 1, πH = 0.78, and qH = 1.53, and when
dealing with type θH, the principal’s expected proﬁt is 0.23. Hence in this numerical example, for λ
suﬃciently low the optimal contract for θH may again prescribe randomization, although in contrast
with the linear case, the optimal qH is below its ﬁrst-best value.
9This is the case for instance in the numerical example introduced above, where ∆B = −0.5 > −BH∆θ/(v − θH) = −0.74.
7Allowing for Randomization Over φ What would happen if instead of assuming φ ∈ {0,1},
φ were allowed to take any value in [0,1]? In that case, randomization over φH would be possible.
However, we argue that it would not be optimal.10 To see why, note that, similar to what happens for
randomization over πH, randomization over φH may only be optimal when (C1) binds — φH enters the
principal’s payoﬀ linearly, so if (C1) is slack then φH optimally takes a corner value. Consider now a
contract MH = {φH,πH,qH,uH}, where φH ∈ (0,1) and uH = 0 (as discussed above, this latter condition
is always satisﬁed at an optimum). Under this contract, the opportunity cost of randomization over φH
for an agent of type θi is equal to −θiπHqH + (1 − πH)Ci − Bi, namely the expected net payoﬀ that
the agent obtains when he undertakes the relationship-speciﬁc investment.11 Following the same logic
as in the case of randomization over πH, if this opportunity cost diﬀers between types, then this may
provide a possible rationale for randomization over φH to be optimal. However, if (C1) binds, then the
net payoﬀ that the agent obtains when he undertakes the relationship-speciﬁc investment under contract
MH is zero for both θL and θH.12 Hence, the opportunity cost of randomization over φH is equal (and
null) for both types. Randomization over φH is therefore ineﬀective for screening between types.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We show that any menu of contracts in which φH = 1 and (2) holds is necessarily
dominated, as P could oﬀer a menu that, whilst violating (2), satisﬁes both ICH and ICL and yields him a
strictly higher expected payoﬀ. Consider a menu M = {MH,ML} = {(φH,πH,qH,uH),(φL,πL,qL,uL)}
such that φH = 1 and (2) holds. P’s expected payoﬀ from M is,
λ{πH [qH(v − θH) − CH] + CH − BH − uH} + (1 − λ)φL {πL [qL(v − θL) − CL] + CL − BL − uL}. (7)
Now consider an alternative menu ￿ M =
￿
￿ MH, ￿ ML
￿
, where ￿ MH = (1,￿ πH, ￿ qH,0) and ￿ ML = (1,1,q,0).
Under A1, ￿ M satisﬁes ICH. It also satisﬁes ICL provided,
￿ πH￿ qH∆θ − (1 − ￿ πH)∆C + ∆B ≤ 0 (8)
We now show that there exist values of ￿ πH and ￿ qH which satisfy (8) with equality (i.e., violate (2)) and
which are such that ￿ M yields P a greater expected payoﬀ than M. P’s expected payoﬀ from ￿ M is,
λ{￿ πH [￿ qH(v − θH) − CH] + CH − BH} + (1 − λ)[q(v − θL) − BL]. (9)
A suﬃcient condition for (9) to exceed (7) is,
￿ πH [￿ qH(v − θH) − CH] − πH [qH(v − θH) − CH] > 0. (10)
10It is straightforward to see that in our framework randomization over φL is also never optimal.
11Recall that in our framework the relationship-speciﬁc investment is necessary for trade between the principal and the
agent to occur. Given a contract {φ, π,q,T} if the agent undertakes the relationship-speciﬁc investment, his expected utility
is T − θiπq + (1 − π)Ci, while if the agent does not undertake the relationship-speciﬁc investment, his utility is T + Bi.
12This follows since, when (C1) binds, then −πHqHθL + (1 − πH)CL − BL = −πHqHθH + (1 − πH)CH − BH = 0.
8Condition (10) ensures that P prefers ￿ M to M. We distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ ≤ q. Hence setting ￿ πH = πH and ￿ qH =
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ ensures (8) holds with equality.
Contract ￿ MH =
￿
1,πH,
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ ,0
￿
is feasible because, if (2) holds, then qH <
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ which
implies (1−πH)∆C−∆B > 0. With ￿ πH = πH the LHS of (10) is πH (￿ qH − qH)(v−θH), which is strictly
positive. Hence, ￿ MH dominates MH and so ￿ M dominates M.
Second, suppose
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ > q. Note that since q∆θ+∆B > 0 under A1, −∆B
∆θ < q <
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ ,
so ∆C − ∆B > 0. There are then two possibilities to consider.
In the ﬁrst case, qH∆θ + ∆C > 0. Inequality (2) can be rewritten as πH < ∆C−∆B
qH∆θ+∆C. By setting ￿ πH =
∆C−∆B
qH∆θ+∆C, ￿ qH = qH we ensure (8) holds with equality. The LHS of (10) becomes (￿ πH − πH)[qH(v − θH) − CH],
which is strictly positive. Hence, ￿ MH =
￿
1, ∆C−∆B
qH∆θ+∆C,qH,0
￿
dominates MH and so ￿ M dominates M.
In the second case, qH∆θ+∆C ≤ 0. For this to hold, we require ∆C < 0. As ∆C−∆B > 0, this implies
∆B < 0. By setting ￿ πH = 1, ￿ qH = −∆B
∆θ we ensure (8) holds with equality. The LHS of (10) becomes
￿
−∆B
∆θ (v − θH) − CH
￿
−πH [qH(v − θH) − CH]. Under (2), a suﬃcient condition for this to be positive is
that,
CH(v − θL) − CL(v − θH) < 0. (11)
Note however that as qH∆θ + ∆C ≤ 0 in this second case, if (11) does not hold then contract MH
is dominated by a contract that sets φH = 0. To see this, note that, by setting φH = 1, the extra
proﬁt obtained by the principal is non-negative only if qH ≥
uH+BH−CH(1−πH)
(v−θH)πH . For this to be consistent
with qH∆θ + ∆C ≤ 0 it is necessarily required that
BH−CH(1−πH)
(v−θH)πH ≤ −∆C
∆θ . In turn, this requires
CH(v − θL) − CL(v − θH) < 0. We therefore conclude that contract M is surely dominated.￿
Proof of Proposition 1: We divide the proof in two parts. We ﬁrst consider the case where (C1)
is slack in the optimal contract. We then consider the case where (C1) binds in the optimal contract.
First consider the solution of (P) ignoring (C1). It is straightforward to see the optimal ML prescribes
φL = πL = 1, qL = q. Consider now the optimal MH.
Lemma 2: If condition (C1) is slack in the optimal contract, then the optimal MH prescribes πH =
φH = 1, qH = q.
Proof of Lemma 2: Ignoring (C1), the FOCs for MH are,
∂UP
∂πH
= φHqH [λ(v − θH) − (1 − λ)∆θ] − φH [λCH + (1 − λ)∆C] (12)
∂UP
∂qH
= φHπH [λ(v − θH) − (1 − λ)∆θ] (13)
∂UP
∂φH
= λ[πHqH(v − θH) + (1 − πH)CH − BH] − (1 − λ)[πHqH∆θ − (1 − πH)∆C + ∆B] (14)
For condition (C1) to be slack, it is necessary that φH = 1. Hence, the LHS of (14) must be positive.13
This has implications for the optimal values of πH and qH. If the optimal πH in the unconstrained problem
is zero, to then have φH = 1 requires λ(CH − BH) − (1 − λ)(∆B − ∆C) > 0. Since CH − BH < 0, a
necessary condition for this is ∆B−∆C < 0. However, when φH = 1 and πH = 0, this requirement would
contradict (C1). Similarly, if the optimal qH in the unconstrained problem is zero, to then have φH = 1
requires λ[(1 − πH)CH − BH] − (1 − λ)[∆B − (1 − πH)∆C] > 0. For this to hold it is necessary that
∆B − (1 − πH)∆C < 0. However, when φH = 1 and qH = 0, this requirement would again contradict
(C1). Hence, if (C1) is slack in the optimal contract, then the optimal πH and the optimal qH must
13Recall that, as mentioned in footnote 7, if indiﬀerent between φH = 1 and φH = 0, P will select φH = 0.
9both be strictly positive. As mentioned earlier, we adopt the convention that, if indiﬀerent between all
possible values of qH ∈ [0,q], the principal will select qH = 0, and, similarly, if indiﬀerent between all
possible values of πH ∈ [0,1], the principal will select πH = 0. Since, as proved above, qH = 0 and/or
πH = 0 are not consistent with φH = 1, we conclude that if (C1) is slack in the optimal contract, then
the optimal qH must be = q, and the optimal πH must be = 1.￿
When πH = φH = 1, qH = q, (C1) becomes q∆θ + ∆B ≥ 0, which is satisﬁed with strict inequality by
A1. It remains to verify consistency; given πH = φH = 1, qH = q, the LHS of (12), (13) and (14) must
be strictly positive, to ensure that πH = φH = 1, qH = q is indeed optimal. It is straightforward to show
that this happens whenever,
λ > max
￿
∆C + q∆θ
q(v − θL) − CL
,
∆θ
v − θL
,
∆B + q∆θ
q(v − θL) − BL
￿
. (4)
Hence, when (4) holds, the optimal contracts prescribe πi = φi = 1, qi = q for both i = L,H. Moreover,
uH = 0, while uL = q∆θ + ∆B (it is straightforward to check that this satisﬁes ICH). Condition (C1)
is slack. This establishes the ﬁrst part of the proof of proposition 1.
Second part: When (C1) binds, qH =
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ , and P’s expected payoﬀ is,14
UP = λφH
￿
πH
￿
(1 − πH)∆C − ∆B
πH∆θ
(v − θH) − CH
￿
+ CH − BH
￿
+ (15)
(1 − λ)φL [πLqL(v − θL) + (1 − πL)CL − BL].
It is straightforward to see the optimal ML in this case also prescribes φL = πL = 1, qL = q. The optimal
MH maximizes (15) subject to qH ∈ [0,q]. The FOCs are,
∂UP
∂πH
= λφH
￿
−∆C(v − θH)
∆θ
− CH
￿
= λφH [CL(v − θH) − CH(v − θL)] (16)
∂UP
∂φH
= λ
￿
πH
￿
(1 − πH)∆C − ∆B
πH∆θ
(v − θH) − CH
￿
+ CH − BH
￿
(17)
Two cases can arise.15 In the ﬁrst CL(v − θH) − CH(v − θL) < 0, so conditional on φH = 1, ∂UP
∂πH < 0
and P sets πH as low as possible. If ∆C > ∆B then
∂qH
∂πH < 0 and the lowest feasible πH solves
q =
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ , so πH = ∆C−∆B
q∆θ+∆C. Provided ∆C−∆B
q∆θ+∆C (q(v − θH) − CH) + CH − BH > 0, the optimal
φH is 1. If ∆C < ∆B then
∂qH
∂πH > 0 and the lowest feasible πH solves qH = 0. Similarly, if ∆C = ∆B
then when φH = 1 (C1) may only bind if qH = 0. However, φH = 0 is preferred by P in this case, since
it allows P to avoid having to pay a positive transfer (namely, BH − (1 − πH)CH) to type θH to induce
his participation.
In the second case, CL(v − θH) − CH(v − θL) > 0, so conditional on φH = 1, ∂UP
∂πH > 0 and P sets πH as
high as possible. If ∆B < 0, then πH = 1 and qH = −∆B
∆θ . Provided −∆B
∆θ (v − θH) − BH > 0, it is then
optimal to set φH = 1. If ∆B > 0, it is then optimal to set φH = 0 as this is the only way to ensure
(C1) binds. To see this, note that we can only be in the case CL(v −θH)−CH(v −θL) > 0 if ∆C < 0 so
that, if ∆B > 0, then ∆C < ∆B. This implies
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ < 0 for all πH, and therefore (C1) never
binds unless φH = 0. Similarly, if ∆B = 0, then when φH = 1 (C1) may only bind if qH = 0. However,
14More precisely, qH =
(1−πH)∆C−∆B
πH∆θ must necessarily hold if φH = 1 and (C1) binds. If φH = 0, then clearly the value
of qH is irrelevant. The expression (15) captures P
′s expected payoﬀ in both cases.
15The knife-edge case where CL(v − θH) − CH(v − θL) = 0 is ignored for brevity.
10as argued above, φH = 0 is then preferred by P. To complete the description of the optimal contracts,
note that when (C1) binds the optimal contracts prescribe uH = uL = 0. It is straightforward to check
ICH is satisﬁed in all the cases we have identiﬁed.￿
5.2 Assumption A1 Does Not Hold
For completeness, we consider the case in which 0 ≥ q∆θ + ∆B and so θH types have incentives to
understate their costs and mimic θL types. The remaining assumption A2 is assumed to still hold. The
counterparts for the main results are as follows,
Lemma 1B: It is never optimal for the principal to oﬀer φL = 1 in conjunction with πL and qL satisfying,
−πLqL∆θ + (1 − πL)∆C − ∆B < 0. (18)
An implication is that the participation constraint of type θH will not bind at the optimum. The optimal
contracts are now found by letting ICH hold with equality, setting uL = 0, and ignoring ICL. The
counterpart to (C1) is,
φL [−πLqL∆θ + (1 − πL)∆C − ∆B] ≥ 0. (C1B)
Proposition 2B: For type θH, the optimal contract always prescribes φH = πH = 1, qH = q. If
λ < min
￿
q(v − θL) − CL
q(v − θH) − CH
,
v − θL
v − θH
,
q(v − θL) − BL
q(v − θH) − BH
￿
(19)
then (C1B) is slack, and the optimal contract for type θL has φL = πL = 1, qL = q. If (19) doesn’t
hold, then (C1B) binds, and the optimal contract for type θL is,
(i) if CH <
CL(v−θH)
v−θL and ∆C − ∆B <
(BL−CL)(q∆θ+∆C)
q(v−θL)−CL < 0: φ
L = 1, πL = ∆C−∆B
q∆θ+∆C and qL = q.
(ii) if CH >
CL(v−θH)
v−θL and ∆B < −BH∆θ
v−θL < 0: φL = πL = 1 and qL = −∆B
∆θ .
(iii) in all the other cases: φL = 0.
5.3 A Numerical Example
Suppose θH = 0.75, θL = 0.25, q = v = 2, and agent’s ex ante and ex post outside options are BH = 1.85,
BL = 2.35, CH = 1.75, and CL = 1.95. For (4) to hold we require λ ≥ 0.52. If λ < 0.52, then (C1) must
bind in the optimal contract. From (3), if φH = 1 this implies qH = 2
5 + 3
5πH , and to ensure qH ≤ q = 2,
we require πH ≥ 0.375. Conditional on φH = 1, the principal then selects πH ∈ [0.375,1] to maximize her
expected payoﬀ when dealing with a type θH agent, UP = πH
￿￿
2/5 + 3
5πH
￿
1.25 − 1.75
￿
−0.1. Since UP
is decreasing in πH, so the principal selects the lowest πH compatible with (C1). The optimal contract
for θH then is, φH = 1,πH = 0.375,qH = q = 2, and when dealing with type θH agents, the principal’s
expected payoﬀ is 0.18.
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